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flict of interest.39 It is probable that the use of the fictions attributing
an agent's knowledge to a principal" in such a case would violate
due process of law. The cases in which the agency is valid but the
principal fails to receive notice would seem, like many other due
process questions, to require a close examination of the facts of each
case. Only after a close scrutiny of each particular set of facts could
the courts decide whether the defendant had been accorded the pro-
tection that due process requires.
Robert G. McCain, III
Res Judicata - Actions in Rem - Durfee V. Duke
I. JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is the power or ability of a court to entertain and to
decide a particular legal controversy or question.1 It consists basically
of two distinct concepts-jurisdiction of the subject matter and
jurisdiction of the person.! Jurisdiction of the subject matter is the
power to hear and decide cases of the general class to which a par-
ticular proceeding belongs.' This jurisdiction must be granted by
law;' it cannot be waived,' nor can it be granted to the court by
consent of the parties.' Jurisdiction of the person is the power of the
court to subject the parties in a particular case to decisions and rulings
made in that case." Unlike jurisdiction of the subject matter, juris-
39 See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
40 See text accompanying note 12 supra.
'Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. W. I. Southern, Inc., 306 U.S. 563 (1939); Davis v. Cleve-
land, C. C. & St. L. Ry., 217 U.S. 157 (1910); Brown v. Pyle, 310 F.2d 95, 96 (5th Cir.
1962); Korac v. Korac, 17 Il. App. 2d 492, 150 N.E.2d 664 (1958); Fincher v. Fincher,
182 Kan. 724, 324 P.2d 159 (1958); Deich v. Deich, 136 Mont. 566, 323 P.2d 35 (1958).
2 Finlen v. Skelly, 310 II. 170, 141 N.E. 388 (1923); State ex rel. Methodist Old Peo-
ple's Home v. Crawford, 159 Ore. 377, 80 P.2d 873, 878 (1938); State ex rel. Smith v.
Bosworth, 117 S.E.2d 610 (W. Va. 1960).
' Noxon Chem. Prods. Co. v. Leckie, 39 F.2d 318 (3d Cir. 1930); State ex rel. Camp-
bell v. Chapman, 145 Fla. 647, 1 So. 2d 278 (1941); Brown v. Jacobs, 367 Ill. 545, 12
N.E.2d 10 (1937); Lemasters v. Williams Coal Co., 206 Ind. 369, 189 N.E. 414 (1934);
Welser v. Ealer, 317 Pa. 182, 176 Ati. 429 (1935).
'People ex rel. Kilduff v. Brewer, 328 Ill. 472, 160 N.E. 76 (1927).
Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165 (1939); Robinson v. Atta-
pulgus Clay Co., 55 Ga. App. 141, 189 S.E. 555, 557 (1937).
'Ex parte Schollenberger, 96 U.S. 369 (1877); Duvall v. Duvall, 224 Miss. 752, 80
So. 2d 752 (1955); State ex rel. Furstenfeld v. Nixon, 133 S.W. 340 (Mo. 1910); Hauger
v. Hauger, 376 Pa. 216, 101 Atl. 2d 632 (1954).
'Collins v. Powell, 224 Iowa 1015, 277 N.W. 477 (1938); Hobbs v. German-Amer.
Doctors, 14 Okla. 236, 78 Pat. 356 (1904).
diction of the person can be waived and can be granted to the court
by the consent of the parties!
Jurisdiction of the person must be exercised either in personam or
in rem.' A judgment in personam imposes a personal liability or
obligation on the person in favor of another; a judgment in rem is
directed against a thing,'" property,'1 or status of a person." One
important aspect of a judgment in rem is that it is binding on all
the world.'"
The United States Supreme Court's position on jurisdiction in rem
is best reviewed and set forth in Hanson v. Denckla: "In rem juris-
diction. Founded on physical power . . . the in rem jurisdiction of a
state court is limited by the extent of its power and by the coordinate
authority of sister states. The basis of jurisdiction is the presence of
the subject property within the territorial jurisdiction of the forum
state."' This concept of the limits of a court's in rem jurisdiction
always has been especially strong in actions concerning real property.
Perhaps the clearest statement is found in Huntington v. Atrill:
"Proceedings in rem to determine the title to land must necessarily
be brought in the state within whose borders the land is situated, and
whose courts and officers alone can put the party in possession.""
In treating problems of jurisdiction the courts often use loose
terminology. The opinions speak vaguely of "jurisdictional facts,"
and in some cases the court will even apply the wrong label alto-
gether. Because the failure of the courts to use precise terminology
gFederal Underwriter's Exch. v. Pugh, 141 Tex. 539, 174 S.W.2d 598 (1943).
'Overby v. Gordon, 177 U.S. 214 (1899); Dillon v. Heller, 39 Kan. 599, 18 Pac. 693
(1888); O'Hara v. Pittston, 186 Va. 325, 42 S.E.2d 269 (1947).
10The Chickie, 141 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1944); In re Hart's Estate, 287 Ill. App. 176,
4 N.E.2d 759 (1936); Gorham Co. v. United Eng'r & Contracting Co., 202 N.Y. 342,
95 N.E. 805 (1911).
" Tobin v. McClellan, 225 Ind. 335, 75 N.E.2d 149 (1947); Kean v. Rogers, 118
N.W. 515 (Iowa 1908); Hughes v. Hughes, 211 Ky. 799, 278 S.W. 121 (1925); Moss v.
Standard Drug Co., 159 Ohio St. 464, 112 N.E.2d 542 (1953).
"Gassert v. Strong, 38 Mont. 18, 98 Pac. 497 (1908); Cross v. Armstrong, 44
Ohio St. 613, 10 N.E. 160 (1887). The most common example of this is a divorce action
in which the status is the marriage itself.
"Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); Dupasseur v. Rochereau, 88 U.S. (21
Wall.) 130 (1901); Killebrew v. Killebrew, 398 I11. 432, 75 N.E.2d 855 (1947); Booth
v. Copley, 283 Ky. 23, 140 S.W.2d 662 (1940); International Typographical Union v.
Macomb County, 306 Mich. $62, 11 N.W.2d 242 (1943).
1'4357 U.S. 235, 246 (1958) (Footnote omitted.); accord, Riley v. New York Trust
Co., 315 U.S. 343, 349 (1942); Baker v. Baker & Co., 242 U.S. 394, 400 (1916); Pennoy-
er v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
5146 U.S. 657, 669 (1892). A strongly worded statement in Rose v. Himely, 2 U.S.
(4 Cranch) 241, 277 (1808), also supports this concept: "It is repugnant of every idea
of a proceeding in rem to act against a thing which is not in the power of the sovereign
under whose authority the court proceeds; and no nation will admit that its property should




has added a semantic problem to an already difficulty area of the law,
it is vital to a consideration of problems in this area to remember
the distinct types of jurisdiction.
II. JURISDICTION AS RES JUDICATA
The development by the Supreme Court of the general rule that
a court's decision that it has jurisdiction is res judicata appears to
conflict with the established principles of an action in rem. A brief
history of the development of the rule that a court's decision on
jurisdiction is res judicata will be necessary to understand this con-
flict. In the early decision of Thompson v. Whitman,0 the Supreme
Court held that the full faith and credit clause' did not preclude an
inquiry by another forum into the question of the first court's juris-
diction." While this remains true to a degree, 19 the rule has been
changed greatly."0
The first change came in the area of jurisdiction in personam.
Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n." initiated the doctrine
that if the defendant appears and litigates the issue of the court's
jurisdiction over his person, a decision by the court that it has juris-
diction will make that issue res judicata and prevent collateral attack
on that basis. This principle appears to be well entrenched and is set
out in the Restatement of the Law of Judgments." A series of de-
16 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 457 (1874).
1 "Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records, and
judicial proceedings of every other state." U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1. "[Slame full faith and
credit in every court . . . as they have by law or usage in the courts . . . from which
they are taken." 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1958).
"8Cf., Wilcox v. Jackson, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 498 (1839); Elliot v. Peirsol's Lessees, 26
U.S. (1 Pet.) 328 (1828).
19See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71 (1961).
2" Stoll v. Gottlieb best sets out the rationale behind this modification:
It is just as important that there should be a place to end as that there should
be a place to begin litigation. After a party has his day in court, with oppor-
tunity to present his evidence and his view of the law, a collateral attack
upon the decision as to jurisdiction there rendered merely retries the issue
previously determined. There is no reason to expect that the second decision
will be more satisfactory than the first. 305 U.S. 165, 172 (1938).
"283 U.S. 522 (1931):
Public policy dictates that there be an end of litigation; that those who have
contested an issue shall be bound by the result of the contest, and that matters
once tried shall be considered forever settled as between the parties. We see
no reason why this doctrine should not apply in every case where one volun-
tarily appears, presents his case and is fully heard, and why he should not,
in the absence of fraud, be thereafter concluded by the judgment of the tri-
bunal to which he has submitted his cause. Id. at 525.
Actually this principle appears in the earlier case of Chicago Life Ins. Co. v. Cherry, 244
U.S. 25 (1917), but it is not enunciated very clearly.
" Restatement, Judgments § 9 (1942) and Restatement, Conflicts of Laws § 451 (1)
(1942): "Res Judicata and Jurisdiction over the Person: Where a defendant appears in an
action to object that the court has no jurisdiction over him and the court overrules' the
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cisions has established that the rule applied in Baldwin also is applic-
able to the decision of a court that it has jurisdiction of the subject
matter.'" Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co. clearly establishes this
adaptation with the statement: "One trial of an issue is enough.
The principles of res judicata apply to questions of jurisdiction as
well as to other issues, as well to jurisdiction of the subject matter as
of the parties."'" The later case of Chicot County Drainage Dist. v.
Baxter State Bank" broadened the doctrine to include not only cases
in which the issue of subject matter jurisdiction in fact was litigated,
but also those cases in which it merely could have been litigated.
The rule that a finding of jurisdiction is res judicata has been
applied to actions in rem prior to this time, although never in a suit
involving land. Both Sherrer v. Sherrer," a divorce, and Davis v.
Davis," a separation, were actions in rem or at least partook of some
of the characteristics of actions in rem." In Sherrer, in which the
wife sued for divorce in Florida, the court found that it had juris-
objection and judgment is rendered against him, the parties are precluded from collaterally
attacking the judgment on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the defend-
ant."
'Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948); Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S.
66 (1939); Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165 (1938); Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32 (1938).
The additional criteria to be applied in determining whether a decision may be collaterally
attacked for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter are found in Restatement, Judg-
ments § 10 (1942):
Res Judicata and Jurisdiction over the Subject Matter.
(1) Where a court has jurisdiction over the parties and determines that it
has jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties cannot collaterally
attack the judgment on the ground that the court did not have jurisdic-
tion over the subject matter, unless the policy underlying the doctrine
of res judicata is outweighed by the policy against permitting the court
to act beyond its jurisdiction.
(2) Among the factors appropriate to be considered in determining that the
collateral attack should be permitted are that
(a) the lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter was clear;
(b) the determination as to the jurisdiction depended upon a question
of law rather than fact;
(c) the court was one of limited and not of general jurisdiction;
(d) the question of jurisdiction was not actually litigated;
(e) the policy against the court's acting beyond its jurisdiction is strong.
Even though the rule of res judicata applies in the area of subject matter jurisdiction,
exceptions are made. For example, an exception is made in the case of a federal pre-
emption of jurisdiction, Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433 (1940), and in an instance of
sovereign immunity, United States v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506 (1940).
24 308 U.S. 66, 78 (1939).
". 308 U.S. 371 (1940).
,'334 U.S. 343 (1948).
2"305 U.S. 32 (1938).
21 "Although it is now settled that a suit for divorce is not an ordinary adversary pro-
ceeding, it does not promote analysis, as was recently pointed out, to label divorce proceed-
ings as actions in rem. . . . But insofar as a divorce decree partakes of some of the charac-
teristics of a decree in rem, it is misleading to say that all the world is party to a pro-
ceeding in rem." Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 232 (1945). For an interesting
statement of the state's interest in the res in a divorce action see Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378
(1948).
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diction and the decree was granted. The former husband instituted a
proceeding in Massachusetts collaterally attacking the Florida divorce
decree on the theory that the Florida court had not acquired juris-
diction. The Massachusetts court found that the wife never was
domiciled validly in Florida and, therefore, that the divorce decree
was void because the Florida court never acquired jurisdiction of
the res. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the decree was
valid because the Florida court's finding of jurisdiction was entitled
to full faith and credit as res judicata.
Although both Sherrer and Davis apply the res judicata rule to sus-
tain the original divorce decree, both courts seem to have dodged the
in rem aspects of the case. The Sherrer opinion speaks vaguely in
terms of "jurisdictional facts,"' 9 while Davis uses the terminology
"jurisdiction of the subject matter and person."3 Apparently, neither
court applies the res judicata rule explicitly to a finding of jurisdic-
tion in an in rem action, but both courts reach that result in effect.
III. DURFEE v. DUKE
The conflict that exists between the principles applicable to an
action in rem and the res judicata rule of Baldwin"' is illustrated well
in the recent case of Durfee v. Duke.!' In that case the Missouri
River, forming the boundary between Nebraska and Missouri, moved
either by avulsion or accretion, drawing into question the ownership
of land that had previously been an island. Petitioner, a Nebraska
citizen, brought suit in a Nebraska court to quiet his title to the
land. Respondent, a Missouri citizen, appeared in the Nebraska court
and litigated the issues, particularly contesting the court's jurisdiction
over the "subject matter." (This is illustrative of the semantic prob-
lem previously mentioned-the issue in question was the court's
jurisdiction over the res; both state courts had jurisdiction over the
subject matter."3 ) The court found that the land was in Nebraska
and quieted title in the petitioner. Respondent appealed to the Su-
preme Court of Nebraska which specifically found that the land was
in Nebraska and, therefore, that the lower court had jurisdiction and
had correctly decided the case." Subsequently, the respondent brought
9 334 U.S. 343, 345 (1948).
30305 U.S. 32, 35 (1938).
'" Baldwin v. Iowa Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522 (1931).
32375 U.S. 106 (1963).
"Subject matter jurisdiction is the power to hear and decide cases of a certain class.
Both state courts, Missouri and Nebraska, have the power to hear cases to determine title
to land.
"Durfee v. Keiffer, 168 Neb. 272, 95 N.W.2d 618 (1959).
[Vol. 18
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an action in a Missouri court to establish her title to the same land.
Petitioner removed to a federal district court which expressed the
opinion that the land was really in Missouri, but which dismissed
the suit on the ground that the Nebraska decision made the matter
res judicata" The court of appeals reversed, saying that, because the
controversy involved land, normal res judicata principles did not
apply and that a Missouri court was free to retry the jurisdiction
issue.8 The court of appeals decision, in effect, would have established
the rule that a finding by a court that certain land lies within its
jurisdiction is not res judicata. The Supreme Court reversed the court
of appeals holding that a Missouri court could inquire into the ques-
tion of the Nebraska court's jurisdiction over the land, but that if
the inquiry revealed that the issue of jurisdiction over the land had
been fully and fairly litigated, the Missouri court must give the
Nebraska decision full faith and credit as res judicata despite the fact
that the situs of the land was in dispute."
The decision in Durfee v. Duke again applies the res judicata rule
of Baldwin" and Treinies8 ' to an in rem action. As in Sherrer ° and
Davis"5 the court evades what appears to be the direct problem. The
terms "action in rem" or "jurisdiction in rem" are never used; the
Court sidesteps the issue by speaking solely of "jurisdiction of the
subject matter." The Supreme Court, more than any other institu-
tion, should assume the duty to aid litigants and lawyers by making
this legal terminology clear. To treat a court's decision that it has
jurisdiction in rem with phrases such as "jurisdictional facts" and
"jurisdiction of the subject matter" can only create confusion and
obscure the problem. If the Court wishes to overrule previously
established principles concerning jurisdiction in rem, an open treat-
ment and recognition of the problem would seem the best course.
In Durfee v. Duke, jurisdiction of the res is dependent upon the
answer to a factual question concerning the location of the land
either within the boundaries of Nebraska or Missouri. The Nebraska
court decided that the land was in Nebraska; the federal district
court expressed the opinion that the land was in Missouri. Because
the issue was in dispute, the Missouri court, under the old in rem
principles, would have been permitted to entertain a collateral attack
" Duke v. Durfee, 215 F. Supp. 901 (W.D. Mo. 1961).
38Duke v. Durfee, 308 F.2d 209 (8th Cir. 1962).
" Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106 (1963).
"SBaldwin v. Iowa Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522 (1931).
35 Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66 (1939).
*°Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
"'Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32 (1938).
1964]
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on the question of the Nebraska court's jurisdiction of the res, even
though the issue was fully and fairly litigated by the parties in the
Nebraska proceeding." Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that the
decision is res judicata despite the fact that land was involved and de-
spite the possibility that the land was in Missouri. The Court said, "we
discern no reason why the rule [of res judicata] should not be fully
applicable."4
It must be noted that both the majority and concurring opinions
are careful to point out that neither Nebraska nor Missouri is bound
in any way by this decision. They would be free to settle their
boundary by interstate compact or by an original suit in the Supreme
Court." The Court apparently accepted the principle that the res
judicata rule does not apply to persons who are not parties to the
suit or who are not in privity with them. The Court held that the res
judicata rule applies at least to those who appear in the lower court
and fully litigate the question of situs of the res, but the question
whether such a decision will be res judicata to parties who appear but
who do not fully litigate the issue is left open. The answer turns upon
the interpretation of the language "fully and fairly litigated." The
rule of Chicot," that a finding is res judicata to persons who have had
an opportunity to litigate the issue, is determinative. Thus, a collateral
attack on jurisdiction should not be permitted.
IV. CONCLUSION
In a feudal economy, ownership of land was the basic source and
form of wealth. Money, the object of an action in personam, is now
the primary form of wealth in this country. It is worth inquiring
whether there are really such important policy considerations that
things, just another and less important form of wealth, still should
be confined narrowly within a special set of rules governing actions
in rem. At one time, requirements of service to have jurisdiction of
the person were strict.' With the advent of rapid and mass trans-
portation, practical considerations have forced a change in the judicial
attitude toward personal service. Such devices as nonresident motorist
statutes and long arm statutes gradually have eroded these require-
ments until today mailing a notice to the last known address or
merely serving a designated state official is held sufficient service
42 See text accompanying notes 10-15 supra.
43375 U.S. at 115.
" 375 U.S. at 116; U.S. Const. art. III, § 2; 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (a) (1958).
" Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940).
"Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
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in some circumstances." The historic doctrine that only the situs state
has the power to adjudicate concerning a "thing" may be under-
mined in similar fashion.
One line of authority requires the courts of the situs state to en-
force an equitable decree of a foreign court ordering a claimant to
convey his interest in a res located in the situs state."' Since equitable
decrees are in personam actions, the rule of Baldwin" applies and the
decision is res judicata to the parties involved. However, this approach
avoids the problem of giving res judicata effect to the decision of a
foreign court in an in rem proceeding concerning land outside its
jurisdiction." The strict in rem concept was struck by circular attack
in both Sherrers' and Davis." But in the Durfee decision the court is
bolder, invading the stronghold of in rem principles-land. In the
principal case the situs of the land was in dispute, but perhaps the
next step is to require enforcement of an extraterritorial decree con-
cerning land which clearly is not within the jurisdiction of the court
handing down the decision."s
John Micheal Webb
"E.g., Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 2031b (1964).
"s Redwood Inv. Co. v. Exley, 64 Cal. App. 455, 221 Pac. 973 (Dist. Ct. App. 1923);
Matson v. Matson, 186 Iowa 607, 173 N.W. 127 (1919); McElreath v. McElreath, 162
Tex. 190, 345 S.W.2d 722 (1961) (the dissent presents one of the clearest arguments
against recognizing such decrees); Mallette v. Scheerer, 164 Wis. 415, 160 N.W. 182
(1916). The problem generally is treated in Currie, Full Faith and Credit to Foreign Land
Decrees, 21 U. Chi. L. Rev. 620 (1954); Barbour, The Extra-Territorial Effect of the
Equitable Decree, 17 Mich. L. Rev. 527 (1919).
"'Baldwin v. Iowa Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522 (1931).
"' Fall v. Fall, 75 Neb. 104, 113 N.W. 175 (1907). "[T]he doctrine that jurisdiction
respecting lands in a foreign state is not in rem, but one in personam, is bereft of all prac-
tical force, if the decree in personam is conclusive and must be enforced by the courts of
the situs." Id. at 179.
" Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
52Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32 (1938).
" Mr. Justice Jackson, in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., states that
the standards of actions in rem are "so elusive and confused generally" and seems to suggest
that this "historic antithesis" is not as important as some other considerations. It is in-
teresting to speculate on the reasonableness of disregarding this distinction altogether. 339
U.S. 306, 312-13 (1950).
In speaking of the phrases "in personam," "in rem," and "quasi in rem," Professor
Hazard has the following to say; "I believe that much of the difficulty with decisions on
jurisdiction in this sense, and with scholarly efforts to penetrate the problems of jurisdic-
tion, is attributable to the obscurities of these terms themselves." Professor Hazard goes on
to suggest the elimination of these phrases in favor of "more intelligible terms." Hazard,
Research in Civil Procedure 66-67 (1963).
